Recently in Laska v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 2013
Wisc. App. LEXIS 234 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
reviewed the decision of a circuit court that allowed the defendant, University
of Wisconsin Hospital, to assert a lien against the tort claims of its patient,
plaintiff J. Conrad Laska, after expiration of the time period within which the
hospital could have billed Medicare for treatment. The plaintiff was eligible
for Medicare when he was injured in an automobile accident. The plaintiff was
treated by the defendant hospital for those injuries. Instead of billing
Medicare for its treatment of Mr. Laska, the hospital filed a statutory lien
against “any tort claims” and “any settlement or judgment resulting from those
claims.” Id.
at *P1. Subsequently, the deadline for billing Medicare passed, and the
plaintiff sought to have the hospital’s lien removed. The circuit court held
that the hospital was not required to withdraw its lien.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the circuit court erred
in interpreting federal Medicare laws to allow the hospital to enforce a lien
after the expiration of the time period within which the hospital could have
billed Medicare for treatment. The plaintiff also argued that Dorr v. Sacred
Heart Hospital, 228 Wis.
2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), bars enforcement of the lien.
As to the interpretation of Medicare laws, the plaintiff
argued that a federal Department of Health and Human Services memorandum,
published in 2000, prohibits providers from enforcing liens against third
parties once the time has elapsed in which to bill Medicare. The 2000 HHS memo attempted
to clarify the Medicare Provider Agreement Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc, which
aims to ensure that no Medicare beneficiary or other person is charged for
services if a beneficiary is entitled to have Medicare pay for those services.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held, however, that a person is not “entitled”
to Medicare when Medicare is a secondary payer and when the primary payer can
be reasonably expected to pay. Therefore, the court reasoned, the 2000 memo
misconstrued federal law when it prohibited providers from maintaining liens
against tort claims after the Medicare billing deadline when Medicare is a
secondary payer so long as the primary payer can be reasonably expected to pay.
In its reasoning, the court relied upon 1995 and 1996 HHS
memoranda, which established that a provider may, subject to certain
restrictions, bill either Medicare or
an insurance settlement—even by lien—as long as it does not pursue payment from
both Medicare and the liability
settlement. The court noted that these memos do not require that all liens be
satisfied prior to the Medicare billing deadline.
As to the 2000 memoranda, the court noted that it was not
bound to follow the interpretations of the federal law as set out in the memo given
that there was an “obvious disconnect between the language of the Provider
Agreement Statute and the 2000 Memorandum’s interpretation of that statute.” Laska
at *P46. The court further reasoned that previous court decisions, including Oregon
Association of Hospitals v. Bowen, 708 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Or. 1989), and American
Hospital Association v. Sullivan, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6306 (D.D.C. May
24, 1990), support the view that a person is not “entitled” to Medicare payments
under the Provider Agreement Statutes “as long a liability insurer can be
reasonably expected to pay.” Laska at *P38. Finally the court notes that
the cost-shifting purpose of the Medicare Secondary
Payer Act would be defeated given that providers would never pursue claims
against non-Medicare insurers unless they could be certain that all claims
would settle prior to the Medicare billing deadline.
In Laska, the Wisconsin court also addressed the
plaintiff’s argument that another Wisconsin case, Dorr v. Sacred Heart
Hospital, 228 Wis.
2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), bars enforcement of the lien against the plaintiff’s
tort claims. The court noted that the Dorr case was factually distinct
from Laska in that it involved an HMO and did not address the Medicare
statutes.
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